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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Unincorporated Divisions of a Corporation
May Be Separate Entities for Purposes of
Antitrust Laws
Plaintiff, a distributor of alcoholic beverages, brought an action for
treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act' against three
unincorporated sales divisions of House of Seagram,2 its parent corporation, Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, and two other corporations, contending that it was eliminated from the wholesale liquor business by
a conspiracy in restraint of trade among defendants in violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The plaintiff requested a jury instruction that each of the unincorporated divisions be treated as a separate
corporate entity, capable of conspiring with the other divisions in
violation of the antitrust law. The United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii, held, instruction granted. Where unincorporated divisions of a single corporation function on the same economic
level and operate independently of one another in the relevant business activity, each is capable of conspiring with the others in violalation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. HawaiianOke & Liquors, Ltd.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii

1967).
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act the showing of a "contract,
combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.. ." is necessary
in order to prove a violation of the statute. As with all conspiracy
offenses, violation of Section 1 requires that two or more persons or
entities engage in the proscribed activity.4 This requirement, although easily met in most cases, has proved difficult to satisfy in finding alleged violations of Section 1 among entities in a single corporate
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
2. Calvert Distillers Co., Four Roses Distillers Co., and Frankfort Distillers Co.
are unincorporated divisions of House of Seagram, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Joseph E. Seagram and Sons.
3. 'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is hereby declared to
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
4. For a discussion of the development of conspiracy as used in § 1 and its relationship to the concept of "restraint of trade," see Raid, Conspiracy and the AntiTrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 744-47 (1950). When the Sherman Act was formulated, restraint of trade was thought necessarily to involve two parties. At that time
"[tihe danger lay not in concentration of power as a characteristic of the industrial
order, but in the propensity of traders to associate or conspire." Id. at 746.
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structure. In United States v. General Motors Corp.5 a court for the
first time upheld the finding of conspiracy between a parent corpora-

tion and its wholly owned incorporated subsidiaries under Section 1.
The court stated that "[t]he test of illegality under the Sherman Act

is not so much the particular form of business organization effected, as

it is the presence or absence of restraint of trade and commerce."6
As yet the courts have refused to find a vertical conspiracy between
a parent corporation and its unincorporated divisions. The courts'
which have faced this issue have relied on Nelson Radio & Supply

Co. v. Motorola which held that there could be no conspiracy between officers and employees of a single corporation, reasoning that
since a natural person cannot conspire with himself, neither could a
corporation. The precursor of the instant case is Kiefer-Stewart v.

Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,9 an action based upon an alleged

horizontal conspiracy between incorporated divisions of House of Sea-

gram to fix resale prices by refusing to sell to plaintiff wholesaler.
Finding a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the

Court stated in Kiefer-Stewart that "common ownership and control
does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws,.

and emphasized that this rule is particularly applicable when the
affiliates "hold themselves out as competitors." 10
Noting that the case was the first action to present the courts with
"an alleged horizontal conspiracy among the unincorporated divisions

of a single corporation,"" the instant court stated two broad principles of antitrust law upon which its decision was based. First, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is "all-embracing," and covers "every"
5. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1942). The four
corporate defendants were charged with conspiracy to force G.M. dealers to financn
their own purchases from the factory and their resales to consumers through General
Motors Acceptance Corp. G.M. owned directly or indirectly all the stock of the
other three defendants. The four corporations had interlocking directorates, and
functioned as coordinated units of the large decentralized enterprise. Id. at 385-86.
6. Id. at 404. The following sentence reads: "But even if the single trader doctrine
were applicable, it would not help the appellants." This could have one of two implications: first, that defendants could be found guilty under § 2, or second, that the
principal concern here is restraint of trade, regardless of conspiracy. This last interpretation disregards the text of § 1.
7. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Kemwel Automotive Corp. v. Ford
Motor Co., 66 Trade Cas. ff 71,882 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Deterjet Corp. v. United
Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962); Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960). These cases are all noted
and distinguished by the instant court. 272 F. Supp. at 918-19.
8. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
9. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
10. Id. at 215. See MeQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 204-07 (1955).
11. 272 F. Supp. at 917.
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form of combination which restrains trade. Second, the "rule of
reason" should direct the court's discretion in determining whether,
from the particular facts of the case, the statute has been violated.
The court stated that it is "well settled" that there can be a conspiracy wihin a corporate structure consisting of a parent corporation
and incorporated subsidiaries. 12 The court held that whether a particular unincorporated division is capable of conspiring depends on
the facts of the case. If the divisions "operate independently" in conducting business activity upon which the conspiracy charge is based,
then the divisions are to be regarded as separate entities for antitrust law purposes. The court closely examined the corporate structure of House of Seagram and determined that in the pertinent areas
of distribution and pricing 13 the three divisions had always acted
with complete independence. 14 The court concluded that such divisions are therefore "legally and factually capable of entering into
the conspiracy alleged." 15
As noted by the instant court, the policy of the antitrust laws includes promotion of competition through prevention of restraints of
trade.' 6 Where two or more enterprises combine to restrain trade
they may be reached under Section I of the Sherman Act for a
"conspiracy" in restraint of trade. A single enterprise which has
an intent to monopolize, or engages in conduct creating a dangerous
probability of monopoly may be attacked under Section 2 as an attempt to monopolize. 7 However, where two units of a multicorporate
enterprise engage in anticompetitive activity not amounting to a Section 2 attempt to monopolize, the courts have hesitated to apply the
Section I conspiracy concept. Under the present law the courts are
faced with the alternatives of expanding the conspiracy concept, enlarging the scope of Section 2, or disregarding such restraints. Those
who advocate the possibility of finding an intra-enterprise conspiracy
feel that the form of the corporate structure should not prevail over
the substance, in that certain entities are separate economic units
12. The court here cites Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); and Phi Delta
Theta Fraternity v. J. A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966).

272 F. Supp. at 919 n.11.
13. Marketing is the only activity which the court considered for a determination
of the individual status of these divisions as competitors.
14. The court noted that the divisional responsibility had changed only slightly
since Seagram was convicted of a similar antitrust violation in Kiefer-Stewart. In fact,
defendant's counsel admitted that the form of corporate structure had been changed
solely to avoid this type of prosecution. 272 F. Supp. at 920 n.17.

15. Id. at 924.
16. Id. at 917.
17. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).

Swift Co.
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organized and managed as competitors.18 The principal criticism 9 of
the doctrine is that it ignores the realities of conducting business in
the modem corporate form. Many corporations have adopted the
subsidiaries or divisions structure to take advantage of the concept
of decentralized management made popular by General Motors.
Others seek to insulate the parent from possible liability for losses
suffered by the subsidiary. Additional motivations include tax avoidance and compliance with various state laws. None of these purposes
relate to the entities' capacities as competitors. However, once a
court rejects the arguments opposing the finding of an intra-enterprise conspiracy it must develop guidelines to determine whether
entities are capable of conspiring. The criteria used by the instant
court are the functional independence of each division in the pertinent
economic activity (sales and distribution), the presence of competition between similar brands marketed by each division, and the lack
of any vertical direction from the parent company. The court said
that the pertinent inquiry is whether "each facet of the unincorporated
division's operation in fact, for all purposes, [is] controlled and directed from above, or is it endowed with separable, self-generated
and moving power to act in the pertinent area of economic activity."20
If units of a multi-division enterprise do in fact operate autonomously
of other divisions and do not receive direction from the parent company, it is plausible for courts to treat them as separate economic
units susceptible to allegations of conspiracy. This refinement of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine limits its application to a small
minority of corporate structures and seems to contain within it a
method to avoid its application. Since a court must rely on corporate
history to determine the degree of integration of activity among
corporate divisions and the degree of control exerted by their parent
company, an enterprise could produce records of consultation and
directives from the parent evidencing a lack of independence. Thus,
the guidelines promulgated by the instant court, while seeking to
ground capacity to conspire in economic reality, severely restrict the
application of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and make the
finding of separate entity status difficult.
18. This argument necessarily applies only to horizontal units in a corporate structure since the finding of a parent-subsidiary conspiracy would not involve competition
between the two entities. The instant court makes this distinction.
19. See Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National

Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. RMv. 1139, 1170-71 (1952); Rahi, supra note 4, at
762-68; REPORT OF

=HEATroRNEY

GENERAL's

NATIONAL COMIUTTEE TO STUDY

,NramiusT LAws 34-36 (1955). Contra, Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the
Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372, 387-88 (1954).
20. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
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Constitutional Law-One-Year Residence Requirement
as Condition of Eligibility for State Welfare
Aid Held Unconstitutional
Plaintiff was denied welfare benefits under the Connecticut Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program on the ground
that she failed to satisfy the Connecticut welfare statutes requirement
that persons coming into the state without visible means of support
must fulfill a one-year residency in order to qualify for payments.'
Plaintiff alleged that the statute was unlawfully discriminatory? and
abridged her right of interstate travel in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Connecticut contended that the residence requirement
was necessary to protect the state from the financial burden that would
result from an undeterred influx of indigents into the state and that
the statute did not deprive the plaintiff of the right to travel or to
settle in Connecticut but merely denied her welfare benefits for one
year. On trial before a three-judge panel in the federal district court
for the District of Connecticut, held, judgment for the plaintiff. Denying welfare benefits to persons entering the state without visible means
of support until such persons have resided in the state for one year
violates the constitutional right of interstate travel and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thompson v. Shapiro,
270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). 3
The states have based their authority to impose residence requirements as prerequisites to eligibility for welfare upon the contention
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-2d (Supp. 1965) provides that: "When any person
comes into this state without visible means of support for the immediate future and
applies for aid to dependent children . . . within one year from his arrival, such
person shall be eligible only for temporary aid or care until arrangements are made
for his return, provided ineligibility for aid to dependent children shall not continue
beyond the maximum federal residence requirement." (Emphasis added). The Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964), limits the residence requirement to one
year. Regulations of the Connecticut Welfare Department construe the term "without
visible means of support" to mean without specific employment or without sufficient
resources to enable the family to be self-supporting. The term "immediate future" is
interpreted to mean within three months after arrival in the state. See Cos-c-cuv
WELFAnm MANuAL, ch. II, § 219.1, cited in Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331,
333 (D. Conn. 1967). The effect of § 17-2d is to withhold aid to dependent children
for one year to newly-arrived residents unless they come into the state with substantial
employment prospects or certain financial xesources. See ComN-crrcuT WELFAm_
MANUAL, ch. II, § 219.2, cited in 270 F. Supp. at 334.
2. Plaintiff contended that Connecticut discriminated against her in favor of newlyarrived residents with employment, newly-arrived residents with a cash stake, and
residents of one year's duration.
3. In Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1967), the court
held that an indigent mother's constitutional rights to travel and to equal protection
of the laws invalidated the District of Columbia welfare statutes one-year residence
requirement.
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that the receipt of welfare benefits is a privilege granted by the state
and not a right of citizenship.4 The rationale for these requirements
is that the receipt of welfare, being merely a privilege, may be subject
to reasonable qualifications, one of which is the imposition of a
residence test which is necessary to protect state welfare funds.
This argument follows the traditional dichotomy between the terms
right and privilege.5 While possession of a right signifies the possessor's exemption from governmental power to alter his legal relations, the possession of a privilege may be qualified by the grantor
of the privilege. This right-privilege distinction, however, does not
avoid the broad scope of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment which forbids the laws of a state, whether relating to
rights or privileges, to deny equal protection to any person within
the state.6 Residence requirements have been attacked on two
grounds: they deny the newly-arrived citizen the equal protection
of the laws of the state and they abridge a citizen's constitutional
right to interstate travel and to establish residence in the state of his
choice. The Supreme Court has stated that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits "undue favor and
individual or class privilege, on the one hand, and . . . hostile dis-

crimination or the oppression of inequality, on the other. It . . .
[seeks] an equality of treatment of all persons . . .7 and state
regulations must "operate alike upon all persons ... under the same

circumstances and conditions."' Despite these pronouncements, the
Court has recognized that the right to equal protection of the law is
not an absolute right. The Court has conceded that while the equal
protection clause requires uniform application of laws to all persons
similarly situated, the legislature is allowed wide discretion in the
selection of certain classes of people upon whom it imposes operation
of its statutes.9 This selection, in order to be violative of the equal
protection clause, must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.10
4. In Harrell v. Board of Commissioners, 269 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D.D.C. 1967), the
court stated that welfare aid is a grant, "not the fulfillment of a contractual obligation." See also People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill.
557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940),
where the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a residence test on the ground that since
the state had no duty to furnish welfare it could impose restrictions on aid in
order to protect state funds.
5. For a discussion of these terms see HoHFmx, FUNDAMNTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
5-8 (W. Cook ed. 1923).
6. The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that both rights and privileges
are protected by the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
7. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33 (1921).
8. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
9. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).
10. Phelps v. Board of Educ., 300 U.S. 319 (1937); Smith v. Calhoon, 283 U.S.
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Following these principles, the Court has not granted all persons an
absolute equality and has permitted unequal state treatment of
various classes of persons11 subject to the limitation that a state's
discrimination between classes of persons is valid only if "'the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.' "12
The Court has further qualified the validity of such classifications
by stating that disparate treatment may not be justified because of
some remote administrative benefit to the state. 13 In conformity with
this line of reasoning, the federal district court of Delaware in the

recent case of Green v. Department of Public Welfare 4 held that

a one-year residence requirement created "an invidious distinction' in

violation of the equal protection clause and stated that protection
of the public purse by discouraging needy persons from entering the

state "is not a permissible basis for differentiating between persons
who otherwise possess the same status in their relationship to the
[s]tate ... ."5
The second ground upon which state residence requirements for
welfare recipients have been attacked is that of the right of interstate
travel. While the right to travel, once its legal basis is established, is
not exempt from limitations, it is also within the purview of the equal
protection clause, and state regulations covering that right cannot

treat different classes of persons unequally without a reasonable basis
for the discrimination.

The constitutional source of the right of

533, 566-67 (1931); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929); Bachtel
v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36 (1907).
11. Borden's Farm Prods. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936); Ohio ex rel. Clarke
v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (both cases involved state regulations of business).
Some state courts have justified restraints against indigents as a reasonable means of
attaining what is a proper objective of police power. See Brown, Due Process of Law,
Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 Htsv. L. REv. 943 (1927). Earlier state
court decisions have upheld the removal of indigents on the ground that paupers,
being dependent on public funds, constitute a special class which must be subject
to legislative control. See Harrison v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 724, 43 A. 190 (1899);
Town of Bristol v. Town of Fox, 159 Ill.
500, 42 N.E. 887 (1896); Lovell v. Seeback,
45 Minn. 465, 48 N.W. 23 (1891). The passage of time since these decisions and
the change in social and economic conditions has probably diminished their authoritative weight and relevancy.
12. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 (1965), quoting from McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). See also Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
527-28 (1958), and cases cited therein.
13. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). See also Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948), and Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for
General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CaL. L. REv. 567, 597 (1966).
14. 270 F. Supp. 173 (1967).
15. Id. at 177 (1967). See also Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C.
Nov. 8, 1967), where the court stated that a bona fide resident of District of Columbia
for six months who was indigent and without means to support herself and her
children was no less in need of public support than an indigent who had been in
the District of Columbia for a full year.
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interstate travel, however, has not been clearly identified and remains
uncertain. Prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court indicated in Crandall v. Nevada16 that the right of
interstate travel is an incident of national citizenship which cannot
be abridged by the states. While subsequent Supreme Court decisions
concerning the interstate movement of persons 1 have involved direct
restrictions of a commercial nature, which have been found to violate
the commerce clause,18 some Justices have asserted that the right of
interstate travel discussed in Crandall has become embodied in the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
Edwards v. California,9 where five members of the Court held a
state restriction upon the transportation of nonresident indigents into
the state invalid under the commerce clause, Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring, stated that the case could have been more properly
decided under the privileges and immunities clause. 20 He believed
that state statutes obstructing interstate travel are invalid on the
basis of concepts of national unity, the democratic system of govern16. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 (1867), where a state tax on all persons leaving
the state by commercial vehicle was invalidated because it inhibited the federal
government's need of a freely mobile citizenry and the corresponding right of citizens
to free access to all seats of government. The Supreme Court has frequently asserted
in dicta that the privileges of national citizenship include the right to pass freely
through and reside in any state; e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97-98 (1908); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 79-80 (1872); and that this right is protected against state abridgement by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment; e.g.,
William v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589
(1897).
17. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the interstate movement of persons
is interstate commerce; e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 112
(1890).
18. The Supreme Court has held that a state is without power to impose a tax
on persons for securing or seeking to secure the transportation of freight or passengers
in interstate commerce. Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929)
(Kentucky tax on fuel used in interstate ferry boats held violative of commerce clause);
McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104, 109 (1890) (license tax imposed on railroad
agent for soliciting passengers for interstate travel held unconstitutional tax on interstate
commerce); Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 46, 48 (1886)
(Tennessee tax on sleeping cars used in interstate commerce held void as applied to
interstate transportation of passengers; tax was on right of transit). See also People
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1882); Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).
All three cases held that state tax demanded of master of vessel for every alien
passenger was unconstitutional state regulation of commerce.
19. 314 U.S. 160, 176 (1941).
20. Justices Black and Murphy concurred in the opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas,
314 U.S. at 177, and Mr. Justice Jackson concurred separately, 314 U.S. at 181. The
majority expressed no view contrary to the proposition that freedom of movement is
a privilege of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause,
finding it unnecessary to reach that question. 314 U.S. at 177.
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ment, and the mobility which is basic to the guarantee of freedom
of opportunity.21 Mr. Justice Jackson, also concurring, noted that
although freedom of interstate movement is not unlimited, indigence
is not a valid reason for restricting that movement.2 Later, in Guest
v. United States, the Court, although failing to identify the source
of the right, held that freedom of interstate movement is recognized
and protected under the Constitution. However, in Harrell v. Board

of Commissioners,4 a District of Columbia district court refused to
apply the rationale of these earlier cases to residence requirements of

a state welfare statute and stated that "[t]he suggestion that such a
residence requirement interferes with the freedom of travel . . . is
far-fetched and remote."2
...
A thorough consideration of a particular welfare program must not
disregard the underlying principles and the objectives of American

social welfare legislation. American welfare programs can be separated into two types: measures whose purpose is income main-

tenance of impoverished or unemployed persons; and measures whose
purpose is the reabsorption of unemployed into the labor market.
21. Mr. Justice Douglas stated: "If a state tax on that movement, as in the
Crandall case, is invalid, a fortiori a state statute which obstructs or in substance
prevents that movement must fall. That result necessarily follows unless perchance a
State can curtail the right of free movement of those who are poor or destitute. But
to allow such an exception to be engrafted on the rights of national citizenship would
be to contravene every conception of national unity. It would also introduce a caste
system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government. It would
permit those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to
be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because
he was poor from seeking new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from
large segments of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of freedom
of opportunity. The result would be a substantial dilution of the rights of national
citizenship, a serious impairment of the principles of equality." 314 U.S. at 181.
22. "[A] man's mere property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to
test, qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. 'Indigence' in
itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of
being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed,
or color." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941).
23. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In upholding an indictment based on 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1964), which forbids conspiracy to interfere with rights or privileges secured by the
Constitution, the Court stated that if the object of the conspiracy was to impede a
citizen's exercise of his right to interstate travel, then the conspiracy is subject to
federal prosecution. Id. at 760. See also the concurring opinion of Justices Douglas
and Goldberg in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 250-51, 255 (1964), indicating that
state action is unconstitutional even if it merely hinders interstate movement.
24. 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967). The court held that public assistance is a
grant, not the filfillment of a contractual obligation, and that the imposition of a
residence requirement as a prerequisite to the receipt of a public grant was reasonable
since it is within the discretion of Congress to surround grants of public assistance
with reasonable requirements and prescribe the categories of persons to whom the
grants shall be given.
25. Id. at 921.
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This separation is based on the distinction between those needy
persons for whom only programs of alleviation are feasible and the
impoverished for whom curative programs are appropriate. 26 The
curative programs2 which provide job training and opportunity rather
than mere subsistence income are aimed at eliminating the cause of
poverty and unemployment, whether it be lack of training, education
and experience, or displacement. These programs are generally
regarded as more beneficial to both the individual, who is given the
opportunity to achieve self-reliance, and to society, which benefits
from the individuals productive capability and spending as a wageearner. Alleviative programs,2 on the other hand, which take the
form of income maintenance for impoverished groups, neither stimulate self-reliance nor encourage the recipient to become a producer.
The cost of these programs to society often exceeds the benefits
except in the case of insurance-type programs,2 which are funded by
taxation of the past earnings of the recipients. The strength of
society's inclination to establish a particular program will depend
upon the relative importance attached to the two principal objectives
of aid programs: help for the impoverished individual or stimulation
of the economy. The first objective is generally considered primary,
due to the concern in American society for the dignity of the
individual and for the unemployed worker as a human being as well
as a potential contributor to the economy. However, these concerns
must be balanced against the aid program's possible deterrent effect
on the recipient's initiative and the need to protect the economic
interests of the rest of the population whose incomes may be reduced
as a result of the taxation needed to fund such programs. In the case
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, this concern for the
cost to society is important because the recipients will not be able to
contribute to the economy other than by spending the benefit payments. Balanced against this cost factor is the paramount national
interest in children as potential contributors to society.
In the instant case, the court noted that although the constitutional
source of the right of interstate travel is uncertain and has been the
subject of much debate, the existence of that right is unquestionable.
Stating that "the right of interstate travel embodies not only the
right to pass through a state but also the right to establish residence
26. Ir Am OF ME UNEmPLOY
290 (J. Becker ed. 1965). See generally id. at
275-79, 290-92.
27. Curative programs include the Economic Development Act, Area Redevelopment
Act, Neighborhood Youth Corps, Manpower Development and Training Act, and
Office of Economic Opportunity.
28. These programs include Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Veterans'
Administration, and Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance.
29. These programs include Social Security and Unemployment Compensation.
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therein,"30 the court reasoned that choice of residence is not subject
to local approval, and that indigence cannot be employed as a basis
for the limitation of one's rights. 3' Relying on Guest, the majority
stated that the Constitution proscribed the abridgement of the right
of interstate travel and found that the Connecticut statute had a
chilling effect on the exercise of the right to travel through and
reside in that state.3 In addition, the court found that the Connecticut statute also denied plaintiff equal protection of the laws.
Stating that when the government grants relief to some "it must
justify its denial to others by reference to a constitutionally recognized
reason," 33 the majority concluded that the statute's intended purpose
of protecting the state treasury by discouraging the entry into the
state of persons needing relief was not a valid reason for the discriminatory denial of welfare aid to newcomers.3 The one-year
residence classification was held unreasonable because the state
failed to show that any significant number of newly-arrived residents
come to the state for the purpose of receiving welfare aid; and the
discrimination against those who enter without visible means of
support was unreasonable because there was no showing that in the
long run the applicant with the cash stake would be a lesser drain on
the state treasury. While suggesting that if the Connecticut timelimit were equally applied to all welfare recipients "for the purpose
of prevention of fraud, investigation of indigency or other reasonable
administrative need, it would undoubtedly be valid," 35 the court
emphatically asserted that even a residence requirement designed to
deny aid to all newcomers entering the state solely to seek welfare
benefits would be invalid. The dissenting judge contended that the
Connecticut residence requirement was a reasonable restriction directly related to the problem sought to be remedied. He pointed
out that forty states had established residence tests as a qualification
for the receipt of AFDC, and that Congress had sanctioned such
30. 270 F. Supp. at 336.
31. Id. The court here quoted from Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941): "Property can have no more
dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its possession a
pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where those rights are derived from
national citizenship no state may impose such a test ... "
32. Id. Drawing an analogy to the "chilling doctrine" under the first amendment
the court here cited Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965); Wolff v. Selective
Serv. Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
33. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
34. In Harrell v. Torbriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1967), the court
held that a District of Columbia one-year residence requirement denied a six-month
resident equal protection of the law because the different treatment of one-year residents and residents of less than one year had no reasonable relation to the basic
legislative purpose of the welfare statute.
35. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
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requirements by enacting the Social Security Act. The dissent distinguished Edwards from the present case on the ground that the
California statute actually limited the right of citizens to travel
freely between the states, whereas the Connecticut statute did not
limit interstate travel but only deterred those who would enter the
state for the primary purpose of receiving welfare. In equally
classifying all non-residents who entered Connecticut and applied for
welfare aid within one year, it was maintained that the legislature had
legitimately exercised its police power. The dissent concluded that
without such a statutory deterrent, Connecticut would be powerless
to prevent its becoming a refuge for needy persons from other states
whose welfare payments were less than those for Connecticut.
The instant court's assertion that even a residence requirement
denying aid to those entering the state solely to seek welfare benefits
would be invalid 6 appears to be both a recognition of the national
interest in the free movement of employable persons and an accurate
application of the Supreme Court's criterion that classifications drawn
in a statute must be reasonable in light of the statute's purpose. The
Supreme Court has accepted the appeal of the instant case3 and
will therefore have an opportunity to set standards for balancing the
rights of equal protection and interstate travel against the practical
necessity for some administrative procedure whereby state welfare
funds can be effectively and fairly distributed to those in need, and,
at the same time, protected from possible fraudulent claims and
unjustified burdens imposed by large numbers of nonresident indigents. In light of the fact that forty states 38 have established one-year
residence requirements as conditions for eligibility for aid to dependent children, affirmance by the Supreme Court will require those
states to devise some alternative measure designed both to satisfy
the administrative and financial needs of the states and to protect
the rights of the individual. Many factors involved in the implementation of American welfare programs should be considered by the
Supreme Court in its disposition of the instant case. The financial and
administrative interests of the state require recognition of the fact
that when a government grants benefits to which citizens do not
have a right it needs such power as is necessary and proper to
supervise its largess.39 Moreover, the merit of welfare and the needs
of recipients should not completely override concern for the economic
36. In Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1967), the court
stated that the possibility that some citizens enter the District in order to obtain
greater welfare aid was not suffieient to require a residence requirement, which the
court stated was a "constitutionally impermissible basis for separate state treatment."
37. Thompson v. Shapiro, 36 U.S.L.W. 3214 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 1967).
38. 270 F. Supp. at 339 n.l.
39. See Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 746 (1964).
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interests of the taxpaying citizens whose incomes are reduced as a
result of welfare. The concern for equal protection should recognize
the distinction between requirements necessitated by limited monetary funds and qualifications such as race and ancestry "which rest
upon a closed, fixed class or involuntary status."40 Criticism of the
conditions imposed on the receipt of welfare benefits should consider
the purposes of the conditions, the relevance and availability of
direct regulatory power,41 and the governmental interest in the reduction of the cost of its programs. Connecticut's argument that the
residence requirement was necessary in order to maintain the cost
of AFDC at reasonable levels was unacceptable because the state
estimated that the indigents who would enter Connecticut in the
absence of the residence test would increase the cost of AFDC by
only two per cent.4 Nevertheless, where there is a substantial increase
in cost, this factor should be highly relevant in the evaluation of a
condition necessitated by limited financial resources. The inherent
distinction between curative and alleviative aid programs and the
alternative methods of financing welfare also have an important bearing upon the validity of conditions imposed upon the receipt of aid.
While the curative programs attempt to eliminate the cause of
poverty and make the recipient a self-reliant contributor to the
economy, the alleviative programs, such as AFDC, result in an undesirable reliance by the recipient upon the government, and make
the recipient a contributor only to the extent that he consumes the
benefit payments. Society may realize short-term benefits from the
training of unemployed in curative programs; but the benefits from
the alleviative support of dependent children will not be realized
until the children reach working age. Providing income through the
creation of jobs is economically preferable to the long-term cost to
society of cash assistance, and is a strong argument for imposing
strict limitations upon income maintenance programs such as AFDC.
Nonetheless, such restrictions must bear a reasonable relation to the
purposes of the program.
40. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached,
54 CAL. L. REv. 443, 449 (1966).
41. Id. at 453-56.
42. 270 F. Supp. at 337 n.4.
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International Law-Sovereign Immunity and Act
of State--Hickenlooper Amendment Precludes
Assertion of Act of State Where Act Is
Violative of International Law
In 1958 the defendant, a New York banking corporation, lent a
Cuban governmental corporation fifteen million dollars, secured by
United States government bonds and other obligations. After the
ascension of the Castro regime in 1959 the loan was renewed, but
the following year the Cuban Government confiscated defendant's
branches in Cuba.' Shortly thereafter the bank sold the collateral,
realizing approximately 1,800,000 dollars in excess of the amount of
the loan. Plaintiff, the successor of the Cuban corporation, brought
suit against the bank in federal district court to recover the excess.2
Claiming the Cuban Government was the real party in interest, the
defendant pleaded its seized property as a set-off and entered an
affrmative counterclaim for the excess of the value of that property
over the amount of plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff contended that both
the set-off and the counterclaim were barred by the principle of4
sovereign immunity3 or, alternatively, by the act of state doctrine.
On defendant's motion and plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, held, plaintiff's cross-motion denied. By instituting an action
in a United States court, a foreign sovereign waives immunity to a
set-off, and, although the defendant's claim arises from a public act
of the sovereign, the Hickenlooper Amendment 5 directs that the act of
state doctrine will not preclude a determination on the merits if
the acts in question were in violation of international law. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. FirstNat'l City Bank of New York, 270 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The principles of sovereign immunity and act of state have under1. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1009
n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), quoting relevant portions of the confiscatory decree.
2. Plaintiff filed a second claim for deposits of various nationalized Cuban banks
which had maintained accounts with defendant prior to their nationalization. The
court summarily dismissed this complaint holding that it would not give extraterritorial effect to an act of state which was inconsistent with the policy and law
of the United States. Id. at 1011.
3. Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional principle of international law restraining
a court from entertaining jurisdiction over a foreign state or its property. It was
first stated in American courts, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812), where it has since undergone modification.
4. "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
5. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d)(4), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370

(e)(2) (Supp. 1966).
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gone parallel developments in American jurisprudence: while each
initially served as an absolute bar to relief against a sovereign or to
a suit based on a sovereign's acts, today neither principle will necessarily be effective unless the executive branch suggests its application.
In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman6 the United States Supreme Court
refused to grant sovereign immunity because of the State Department's previous failure to suggest immunity in similar situations. The
State Department's silence raised the implication that foreign policy
did not require a grant of immunity, 7 and whether immunity ultimately should be granted was left to judicial interpretation. In
1952 the State Department announced that it would henceforth
recommend immunity only for public acts of a government (jure
imperii) and not for those governmental acts of a primarily private
or commercial nature (jure gestionis).8 In National City Bank v.
Republic of China,9 a case which allowed relief against the sovereign
on a counterclaim for defaulted treasury notes, the Supreme Court
amplified this trend toward more limited application of sovereign
immunity by establishing a judicial presumption against immunity
whenever the State Department did not suggest its application. 10
The Republic of China case was further significant in that it was
the first to allow a counterclaim for matter unrelated to the sovereign
plaintiff's claim. Since that case, courts have uniformly allowed both
compulsory and permissive counterclaims, but have limited defendants to set-off relief," and only a New York State lower court, in
Et ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp.,'2 has permitted a
defendant's affirmative counterclaim to exceed the amount sought by
the sovereign plaintiff.
6. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Immunity from a libel was denied to a merchant vessel
owned but not possessed by the Mexican Government.
7. The prevention of judicial interference in the area of foreign policy is a common
basis of both the sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines. See Maier, Sovereign
Immunity and Act of State: Correlative or Conflicting Policies?, 35 U. CINN. L. REv.
556 (1966).
8. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). This pronouncement is known as the Tate
Letter. The purpose of the letter (though it acknowledged the State Department's
inability to dictate law to the courts) was to hold foreign nations to standards of
commercial law in their dealings with American businessmen.
9. 348 U.S. 356 (1955). The American bank had counterclaimed for affirmative
relief in addition to set-off, but abandoned the former after an adverse decision in
the court of appeals, 208 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953).
10. Maier, supra note 7, at 562.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 17 App. Div. 2d.927,
233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1962). A governmental agency of Turkey sought damages for
breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The court, in allowing the private defendant's affirmative counterclaim (arising from the same subject matter as plaintiff's
claim), noted that the Republic of China case was not controlling since there the
defendant had abandoned its claim for affirmative relief before the Supreme Court.
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The act of state doctrine is a national principle of judicial restraint.
But unlike sovereign immunity, which is a bar to jurisdiction, act
of state is usually asserted after the court has assumed jurisdiction.
Formerly it was automatically applied to bar adjudication where the
asserted claim was based on the internal acts of a foreign sovereign.
In what is known as the first Bernstein case, 13 Judge Learned Hand
applied the doctrine in refusing to adjudicate the validity of acts
14
of the then-defunct Nazi government. In the second Bernstein case,
the State Department intervened and communicated to the court
that the foreign policy of the United States did not require the
application of the act of state doctrine.' 5 In then refusing to apply
the doctrine, the court created the "Bernstein exception"16-the presumption that, unless the State Department indicated otherwise, the
act of state doctrine would be applied.17 Further liberalization
8 in which the
occurred in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,1
federal district court denied relief to the plaintiff sovereign on the
ground that its claim of title to allegedly converted goods was based
upon a confiscatory decree which was patently violative of international law. Regarding act of state as a domestic conflict of laws
principle grounded in the recognition of and respect for the territorial
sovereignty of each state, the district court felt that the basis for
such recognition and respect vanished when the act of a foreign
sovereign violated not only domestic notions of policy, but also
standards of international law.' 9 Furthermore, the court held that
since the United States had notified the Cuban Government that the
confiscations were illegal by international standards, there was no
danger of embarrassing the executive branch in its conduct of foreign
relations*20 However, after the court of appeals affirmed this liberal13. Bernstein v. van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). The plaintiff Bernstein, a German national, had been
forced by the Nazis to sell certain of his ships to a German Government trustee who
later resold them to the defendant.
14. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Gir. 1954).
15. Id. at 375-76.
16. For the argument that the Bernstein letter created no exception to the act of
state doctrine, see Reeves, The Sabbatino Case and the Sabbatino Amendment:
Comedy-or Tragedy-of Errors, 20 VAND. L. REv. 429, 440 (1967). The author
argues that the State Department's letter merely advised the court as to what were
the present existing laws in Germany at the time the case was before it. If the
plaintiff had won the case instead of settling it, says Reeves, it would have been for
reasons other than an exception to act of state. Id. at 442.
17. Maier, supra note 7, at 561.
18. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
19. The confiscations were held to violate international law because they were
retaliatory, discriminatory, and without compensation. 193 F. Supp. at 384-86.
20. Id. at 381.
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ization2 ' the Supreme Court reversed, 22 returning to the rigid position
requiring application of the act of state doctrine in the absence of a
State Department suggestion to the contrary, and even casting doubt
on the "Bernstein exception."23 In reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision, Congress, in 1964, enacted the so-called Hickenlooper

Amendment,

which effectively overruled the Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Sabbatino by directing the courts to apply the doctrine only
upon executive suggestion or where there appeared to be no violation of international law. The amendment was found to be constitutional when applied in the remand of the Sabbatino case, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr.
Speaking first to the issue of sovereign immunity, the court2 in the
instant case noted at the outset that Banco Nacional and the Cuban
Government were identical for the purposes of this suit. The court
based its decision on the "ultimate policy" of fairness, and, following
the Republic of China27 case, held that the plaintiff, by initiating

proceedings in the district court, had waived immunity from counterclaims to the extent they did not exceed the amount of the plaintiff's

claim. Addressing the act of state issue, the court acknowledged the
supersession of the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision by the

Hickenlooper Amendment, which permitted the court to examine the
legality of the Cuban Government's acts. To the court the confisca21. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
23. Id. at 436.
24. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d)(4), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(e)(2) (Supp. 1966), which reads in relevant part: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right is
asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such
state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January
1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and other standards .... ." Also called the
Sabbatino Amendment, or Rule of Law Amendment, the original version was to expire
on January 1, 1966, but it was amended and passed again in 1965 without a time
limit. For a discussion of the Amendment's history and the motives behind it, see
Reeves, note 16 supra.
25. 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court, following the court of appeals'
holding in Sabbatino that the confiscations were invalid, tentatively dismissed Banco
Nacional's complaint, deferring final judgment until it could be determined whether
the executive branch would indicate if the interests of foreign policy required the
application of the act of state doctrine. After the State Department had informed
the court that such an indication was not contemplated by the executive, the court
rendered final judgment of dismissal. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 272 F. Supp.
836 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) aft'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. The case was heard by Judge Bryan, who also rendered the district court
decisions in the Sabbatino litigation.
27. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); see note 9
supra.
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tions were clearly illegal: not only were they retaliatorym and discriminatory, 9 and therefore violative of standards set forth in the
Sabbatino court of appeals decision, but the confiscations were also
without compensation. While the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court in Sabbatino had not explicitly held that failure to provide
compensation for expropriations was by itself a violation of international law, the instant court noted that the Hickenlooper Amendment 30 had expressly adopted the position that "international law ...
requires full compensation for seizures of American-owned property."31
Although the three standards of retaliation, discrimination and compensation were thought to be representative of international law, the
court stated that it would still have been bound to apply them had
they been inconsistent with the international rules. Since the Cuban
Government seizures were in violation of international law and there
had been no executive suggestion that the act of state doctrine be applied, the court concluded that the defendant should be allowed to
32
set-off the value of the seized property against the plaintiffs claim.
The instant decision is consistent with the policy and the mandate
of the Hickenlooper Amendment in that it affords some measure of
relief to an American enterprise which has lost property under a
foreign expropriation decree. The court, however, avoided a logical
step which would have further limited sovereign immunity, and it
declined to suggest solutions to, or at least crystallize, some jurisprudential problems surrounding its holding on the act of state doctrine. By limiting plaintiff's waiver of immunity to no more than
set-off vulnerability, the court failed to take a step taken thus far only
in the Et ve Balik Kurumu decision.3 While in that case the counterclaim arose from the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim, whereas the defendant's counterclaim in the instant case involved different
subject matter, the permissive-compulsory dichotomy should not be
28. The retaliatory tone of the confiscation decree vitiated the plaintiff's argument
that the confiscations were primarily motivated by general public interest. The court
cited the decision of the court of appeals for the Second Circuit in the Sabbatino
case, 307 F. 2d at 866, in which Judge Waterman opined that "[cionfiscation without
compensation when the expropriation is an act of reprisal does not have significant
support among disinterested international law commentators from any country."
29. The confiscatory decree was discriminatory in that it was aimed solely at
United States' nationals and other banking properties were not seized until a month
later. The court cited no authority for the proposition that such discrimination is
internationally illegal, but again referred to the court of appeals opinion in Sabbatino
which does cite international authority in addition to expounding the United States'
view. 307 F.2d at 866-68.
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (Supp. 1966).
31. 270 F. Supp. at 1008.
32. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied since there were
triable issues of fact and law as to the amount of defendant's set-off.
33. See note 12 supra.
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determinative. Permitting more than set-off would endanger no interest of foreign policy; rather, it would further effect the policy of the
Hickenlooper Amendment. When a foreign sovereign invokes the
jurisdiction of a court, it should expect that all claims between it
and the party againstwhom relief is sought will be justly settled.
While the court's act of state holding was consistent with the
United States' policy of encouraging private investment in certain
underdeveloped countries, it left unanswered questions resulting from
the application of United States' law to the acts of a foreign sovereign
within its own territory. Three choices of law were available to the
court for reaching its decision: Cuban law, the law of the place of
the wrong; United States' law, the law of the forum; or international
law. Under traditional choice of law rules in private international
law cases, the law of the place of the wrong is examined to determine
the rights and duties of the parties affected by the wrong.34 There
exists an exception to this rule where the law of the locus delicti contradicts an important policy of the forum. 35 In that case the forum
rejects the foreign law model in favor of its own policy. However,
the act of state doctrine in effect precludes this public policy exception when the cause of action arises from the acts of a foreign
sovereign. The Hickenlooper Amendment, on the other hand, vitiates
the act of state doctrine's bar, allows forum policy to prevail, and
states that the forum policy requires compensation for expropriation.
Thus the law of the United States was applied to the acts of the
Cuban Government within its own territory. While the model for.
the rule applied was purportedly international law, the court emphasized that the rule itself was United States' law as set forth in the'
Hickenlooper Amendment. The forum policy embodied in the Hickenlooper Amendment goes further than American repugnance toward,
expropriation without compensation; the underlying purpose of the
Amendment is to encourage economic growth in South America and
other underdeveloped areas36by affording some protection to American
enterprises investing there.
While it neither alters nor extends the substantive principles set
forth in the Second Circuit's Sabbatino and Farr decisions,3 7 the instant case is significant in that it presents the substantive problem in
the context of a counterclaim-an affirmative assertion of the Hickenlooper Amendment which had previously been raised only defensively.
The case thus clarifies the effect of the Hickenlooper Amendment:
34. pESTATEMENT OF CoNfLict OF LAWS §§ 377-79 (1934).
35. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
36. See generally E. MOONEY, FOREIGN SEIZURES (1967).
37. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967); Banco Nacional
do Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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United States law imposes a duty upon foreign sovereigns to pay for
property expropriated within their own territories. Unless the defense of sovereign 'immunity could be asserted, it would follow that
any party whose property was seized without compensation would
be able to hold the seizing government or its representative liable
for payment. The result might be embarrassing where the foreign
sovereign enjoys more amicable relations with the United States than
does the Republic of Cuba. Additionally, should the property enter
the United States in the hands of a private person to whom the
defense of immunity would be unavailable, contravention of the
broad policy underlying the Hickenlooper Amendment might result.
The United States' interest in the development of emerging nations
will not be advanced by those nations' inability to trade in property
connected with seizures in compliance with their own law (and,
arguably, international law) but subject to attachment in the United
States. The simultaneous implementation of a policy protecting American investments abroad and contravention of a policy encouraging the
economic development of emerging nations is anomalous, and suggests that both policies might better be served by means other than
the Hickenlooper Amendment, such as investment guarantees. The
proviso in the Amendment allowing executive resurrection of the act
of state doctrine may provide a remedy for some of these problems
once they have arisen, but until executive intervention is exercised it
provides the interested foreign government no basis for prediction.
The instant case also leaves unresolved the question of title. While
the court's implicit finding that title remains in the investor until
compensation is paid by the sovereign protects the private American
investor in a suit by the confiscating sovereign, complications arise
when the investor, the property owner, is sued by a creditor with an
interest in the seized property. If title still lies with the defendant
property owner, then it follows that the owner is still liable to account for the property, which results in an obvious hardship and a
contradiction of the Hickenlooper Amendments policy of protecting
American investment abroad. Perhaps the remedy is executive suggestion that the act of state doctrine be allowed as a defense to the
creditor's suit against the property owner. The success of this defense may depend upon whether the creditor's action is prosecuted
prior to an adjudication of the confiscating government's act of state
claim.
These implications arise from the basic question which must be
asked in light of the instant case: to whose law and policy should a
sovereign look when acting within its own territory? Classically, the
sovereign could rely exclusively on its own law. Now, however, where
the state enjoys private investment by American enterprises, in order
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to obtain a greater degree of predictability, it must also look to
United States' law. This result may be justified in light of this
country's narrower foreign policy aims, but the result creates problems relevant to broader policies and does not seem justified in light
of the search for an international legal order based on traditional
concepts of territoriality.

Products Liability-Lender Held Liable for Gross
Defects in Housing Development It Had Financed
Plaintiffs, purchasers of homes in a subdivision,1 brought an action
in tort against a savings and loan association, the major financier of
the developer,2 for damages arising from gross constructional defects
in the houses. 3 The gravamen of the plaintiffs' claim was that, by
furnishing a substantial portion of the funds for the project, the defendant had assumed a duty to inspect to protect prospective purchasers. 4 The defendant argued that the loan transactions were
insufficient to impose a duty upon the loan association to inspect.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for a nonsuit at the close
of plaintiffs' proof. On appeal to the California District Court of
Appeal, held, reversed. Where a lender furnishes the major portion
of financing for a housing development, it assumes a duty to the
potential buyers, at least to the extent of protecting them from gross
1. Plaintiffs bought homes built from a set of master plans and apparently they
exercised control over neither the specifications nor the building. The buyers sued
the developer, Conejo Development Co., the primary lender, Great Western Savings and
Loan Association, and others for recision and restitution or alternatively for damages
for construction defects. At the trial, the court first tried solely the issues relating to
liability of Great Western [hereinafter referred to as defendant].
2. The financial arrangements were quite complex and never fully disclosed. Defendant lent a substantial sum and arranged the financing so as to make the deal
possible. At one point, it even held title to the land. It also had first refusal as to
the trust deed financing for all of the houses. The developer's capital and experience
were known to be limited.
3. The land contained a type of soil which greatly expanded when wet and
damaged normal foundations. The houses had been built without any special foundations and sold for about $15,000 each. The action of the soil damaged the houses,
and the court estimated the damages at about $6,000 per house. Though the developer
either knew or at least received information so that he should have suspected that
the land had expansive soil, there is no evidence that defendant ever knew or was
informed. However, this type of soil is not unusual in the area and was prevalent in
the valley.
4. The court noted that one of the developers had been in the clothing business
until 1955 and his experience as a developer was largely confined to selling tracts and
that the other developer had built about fifty houses, including a few with the special
foundations necessary to withstand expansive soil.
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structural defects. Connor v. Conejo Land Development Co., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 333 "(Ct. App. 1967).
Although the specific issue of a lender's liability for failure to inspect projects has not previously been determined 5 the broadening
concepts of products liability and their extension to defendants
previously insulated by rules of privity has been a widely recognized
trend. A recent development in this trend is evidenced by decisions
indicating that inspectors may be held liable for injuries caused by
defects in the inspected products. In Buszta v. Souther,6 where a
service station operator negligently inspected an automobile, certifying it to be in good condition, the court in awarding damages to the
injured driver disregarded privity and looked to the obvious and
unreasonable risk of harm if due care is not exercised. Similarly,
in Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp.,7 the court held
that liability could be imposed on Underwriters Laboratory where
an exploding fire extinguisher did not conform to the warranty of the
Underwriters' inspection tag on the label. Although these decisions
rested on the defendant's duty to inspect, in each case the defendant
was negligent in an undertaking upon which the plaintiff might foreseeably rely. However, there is little authority for the imposition of
an affirmative duty to inspect. Traditionally, affirmative duties in
,tort law were limited; but the trend is toward liberalization. Thus in
Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd.,9 the court circumvented the absence
of a duty to act by stretching the exception that one who undertakes
an affirmative course of conduct undertakes a concomitant duty to
exercise due care in its execution. More broadly, progress in products
liability cases in most states has been characterized by increasing
liberality as to the theory of recovery and as to remedy. 10 Thus in
5. There have been several cases proceeding on a restitutionary theory in which
the defendant knew of his debtor's intended fraud. See, e.g., Stewart v. Wright, 147
F. 321 (8th Cir. 1906) (bank financed bogus race); Jorgensen v. Albertson, 129
Wash. 686, 225 P. 639 (1924) (defendant knew, or should have known, and made
false representations which were relied upon).
6. 232 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1967).
7. 269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967).
8. The leading article is Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law
of Tort, 44 AM. L. REv. (n.s.) 209 (1905) (reprinted in BowXasN, SrUms IN Tir
LAW oF ToRTs (1926)). A later treatment is McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties
in Tort, 58 YAL-E L.J. 1272 (1949). The latter article restates Bohlen's observation
that the duty is based on a "benefit principle" analogous to the doctrine of consideration in contracts, a principle that there is a duty when the defendant was to receive
a potential benefit.
9. 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (in bank). The opinion contains a good general discussion of the court's viev as to when a duty is assumed to
protect against foreseeable harm.
10. For an introduction and historical development of the subject, see Prosser's
classic article, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), or his more recent article, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
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Biakania v. Irving," establishing liability without privity even though
the risk involved was restricted to property damage, the California
court held the question to be a matter of policy involving "the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability
of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy of preventing future harm." 2 Thus
a court in California confronted with a novel negligence action
would be free to consider its merits in relation to these standards
regardless of a lack of privity.'3 In this regard, builders and contractors have found a lack of privity no defense. 14 In Sabella v.
Wisler,15 for example, an experienced builder-vendor who constructed
a house on an improperly filed lot was held liable to buyers of the
house for damages resulting when the house began to settle. The
court held that it was immaterial that defendant had not built the
house especially for the plaintiffs, since they were "members of the
class of prospective home buyers for which Wisler admittedly built
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MmN. L. REv. 791 (1966). For a treatment of
historical as well as recent developments in California, see Lascher, Strict Liability in
Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and Past Vandermark, 38 S. CAL. L. REv.
30 (1965).
11. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The court held a notary public who had
negligently prepared a will liable to one who would have been a beneficiary had
it been valid. The case contains a good discussion of the development and demise of
privity in California.
12. 49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. The language was adopted with only minor
changes in wording in Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 863, 362 P.2d 345, 348, 13
Cal. Rptr. 521, 524 (1961), and in Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 28, 377 P.2d
889,893 (1963).
13. There have been other similarly liberal statements in recent California decisions
as to when a duty relationship may be found. See, e.g., the broad statement, cited
in the instant case, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 344, from Raymond v. Paradise Unified School
Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (1963); and the statement in
Merrill v. Buck, also cited in the instant case, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 561-62, 375 P.2d 304,
310, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (1962), that a duty of ordinary care not to injure another
"may arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public policy dictates the existence of such a duty." See also as an indication of the same trend, a recent case imposing a non-delegable duty on manufacturers to supply a product free from dangerous
defects. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 268, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521
(1961), where the state supreme court, in bank, held an independent contractor who
had performed his portion of the work on the swimming pool in a manner which
allowed the water to leak, liable to the owner for damages to the pool and for the
undermining of the house and yard by the leaking water. The doctrines of warranty,
products liability, and strict liability have been slow in penetrating traditional real
property concepts. See, e.g., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent
Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAN.

L. REv. 541 (1961).

15. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
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the dwelling."16 The opinion imposed an affirmative duty upon the
builder to use reasonable care to assure the land was suitable."7 Although the California courts have gone far to impose an affirmative

duty to foreseeable users, regardless of privity, upon anyone actually
engaging in building, manufacturing, or selling, the instant case is the

first to consider the question of the duty owed by one whose only
connection with the product was that of a secured investor.
In the instant case, the court stated that although defendant was
not a direct participant in the construction, it was not insulated from
responsibility to purchasers since privity of contract is not essential
to establish a duty of ordinary care. Noticing that this duty may

arise from a voluntarily assumed relationship if public policy so
dictates, 18 the court determined that public policy required lowincome purchasers to be protected from substantial defects which

a reasonable inspection would not disclose. The court stated that
lenders, like manufacturers, have the power to launch potentially

hazardous products into the market and, like manufacturers, have the

power to control to some extent the quality of the product.19 To

effectuate the public policy purposes applicable to developers and
contractors in such situations, the court held that liability would be

imposed upon a lender who failed to use his position of power to
assure minimal standards. However, the
opinion emphasized that the
20
holding only applied to gross defects.
16. 59 Cal. 2d at 28, 377 P.2d at 893, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
17. The lot had been a quarry and when filled in gave no indication that it had
ever been anything but level ground. However, the court was not concerned that
Wisler did not know the lot was filled and that it was a level lot at the base of a
rock cliff. The court also mentioned that the builder should have become suspicious
of the earth when digging a hole for the foundation but this notice did not appear
necessary for its holding.
18. Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 561-62, 375 P.2d 304, 310, 25 Cal. Bptr. 456,
462 (1962). In addition, the court quoted and cited a number of statements recognizing
broad liability; e.g., Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 28, 377 P.2d 889, 893, 27
Cal. Rptr. 689, 693 (1963); Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 863, 362 P.2d 345, 348,
13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524 (1961); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d
16, 19 (1958). The court also relied on a recent New Jersey case, Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), which applied the analogy of manufacturers and developers and also relied on general policy arguments to demonstrate that
the courts should be liberal to hold the developer and protect the buyer.
19. The court employed a law review article, Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271 (1966), to show that in the low-priced
tract subdivisions of small developers a savings and loan association is usually the
principal backer, the most solvent and reputable party, and the most experienced
participant.
20. Possible breaches of duty listed by the court in this case included: negligent
appraisal and representation of the value of the homes, failure to ascertain and
compensate for soil conditions, approval of packaged plans and specifications without
sufficient examination, engaging in total financing of an insubstantial and inexperienced
developer on a tract of major proportions in a new area, or a failure to adequately
inspect the work in progress in order to discover defects. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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Under the facts presented by the court, the decision is undeniably
appealing. However, the establishment of this significant extension
as a general principle of tort law seems unjustified. The conceptual
and practical problems presented by the holding stem primarily from
the questionable analogy drawn by the court between manufacturers
and contractors and financial institutions. While the manufacturer
and contractor are both builders whose function is integrally connected with making the product, the financial institution's business
is making profitable loans and its function often does not involve
more than a minimum of building expertise or inspection. Sound
management requires it to have men competent to assess land values
and so protect its investment, but these men do not necessarily have
the competence to oversee a builder. While the technical expertise
associated with the production of goods or erection of buildings is a
necessary corollary to the business of the manufacturer or builder,
such expertise is tangential at best to the business of a lending institution. Even limited to substantial defects, the court's rule would
be impractical. The court in its considerations of public policy gave
insufficient consideration to the potential burdens placed upon
lenders in all fields by its decision. The court failed to give proper
weight to the public policy in favor of keeping financing costs,
including building costs, down. It is submitted that ambiguous decisions imposing an open-ended duty prevent the predictability of
result necessary for sound business planning. And finally, if there is
a substantial need for regulation of developers, it is the function of the
legislature to provide it. The duty to protect purchasers against
those from whom they purchase would be better placed upon a
commission or agency than upon a lender with a deep pocket whose
incentive to protect extends only to the limits of its liability.

Taxation-Constructive Ownership Rules Automatically
Applied to Section 302(b) (1)
Dividend Equivalency Test
From 1960 through 1963 petitioner reported as long-term capital
gain payments which she received pursuant to a 1960 redemption
agreement. Under the contract she and her brother agreed with her
son, the sole remaining shareholder, to redeem all of their common
stock in a closely-held family corporation in exchange for a fixed
sum, payable in annual installments.' The Commissioner of Internal
1. From 1948 to 1957, of the 1300 outstanding shares, petitioner owned 650; her
brother 649; and her son 1. In 1957 her son desired to assume a greater share of the
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Revenue assessed a deficiency after applying the family attribution
rules of section 318(a) 2 so that subsequent to the redemption petitioner retained constructive ownership of the corporation and therefore the payments were essentially equivalent to dividends under
section 302(b) (1)3 and taxable at ordinary income rates. Petitioner
contended that the redemption distributions were not "essentially
equivalent" since they resulted in a meaningful change in her
rights of ownership and control regardless of the constructive ownership rules and, further, that the distribution was made pursuant to a
bona fide business purpose sufficient to overcome any inference of
tax avoidance. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's assessment of deficiencies,4 and on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. In the absence of
significant mitigating circumstances to the contrary, section 318(a)
constructive ownership rules apply automatically, regardless of business purpose, indetermining a change in a shareholder's proportionate
ownership for purposes of the dividend equivalency test of section
302(b) (1). Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967).
After the United States Supreme Court determined in Eisner V.
Macomber5 that dividends paid in stock were not income, a tax
avoidance device developed whereby stock distributed as a nontaxable dividend was redeemed by the corporation, which enabled the
shareholder to treat this redemption6 as a sale of stock, paying only a
capital gains tax on the profit realized, and thus totally escaping the
ordinary income tax payments due on cash dividends.7 Congress
provided in 1921 that if such distributions and redemptions were
"essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the
amount received... [would] be treated as a taxable dividend...."8
This test, as embodied in section 115(g) of the 1939 Internal Revenue
Code, was applied to all stock redemptions to distinguish between
business and, therefore, all certificates were canceled and new shares issued as follows:
petitioner 485; her brother 484; and her son 331. Then in 1960 the three shareholders
resolved that the corporation would redeem all of the stock owned by petitioner and
her brother so that petitioner's son could own the business outright, while his mother
and uncle could retire with a continued means of support. Subsequent to the redemption, petitioner and her brother (until his death in 1962) were retained as directors
of the corporation for reasons of "respect and sentiment," but petitioner's son conducted the business with "a greater freedom of action." Beatrice Levin, 47 T.C. 258,
259-60 (1966).
2. INT. RE:v. CODE of 1954, § 318(a).
3. Id., § 302(b)(1).
4. Beatrice Levin, 47 T.C. 258 (1966).
5. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
6. See INT. Biv. CODE of 1954, § 317(b).
7. Holden & Mickey, DistributionsEssentially Equivalent to a Dividend-Understand-'
ing The Equation, 43 N.C.L. Pwv. 32, 33 (1964).
8. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228 (1921).
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"sales or exchanges" of corporate interests and mere dividend distributions. The meaning of the tests vague language was, however,
left to judicial interpretation, and the courts developed various
evidentiary criteria9 considered to be relevant to dividend equivalency. Since the objective of the statutory test was the detection and
elimination of tax avoidance schemes, the most important criterion,
although not always controlling, was the presence or absence of a
bona fide business purpose for the redemption. 10 Then in a 1945
decision, Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford," the Supreme Court
adopted a "net effect" approach which utilized the economic realities
of a redemption as the controlling criterion and foreclosed inquiry into
subjective motives. 12 Eventually, however, two lines of reasoning
developed which can be categorized generally as the "strict" and
"flexible" net effect tests. The "strict" test, adhering to the emphasis
on objectivity of the Supreme Court in Bedford, involved a comparison of the economic effects of the actual redemption distribution
with hypothetical economic effects had there been a dividend distribution, culminating in a determination of dividend equivalency if
the comparative results were essentially the same. 13 While also
making a comparative review of the economic realities of the distribution, the "flexible" test enabled the court to admit evidence of business
9. Some questions asked by the courts were: (1) was there a bona fide corporate
business purpose; (2) was the action initiated by the corporation or by the shareholder;
(3) did the corporation adopt any plan or policy of contraction; (4) did the corporation continue to operate at a profit; (5) did the transaction result in any substantial
change in the proportionate ownership of the stock held by the shareholders; (6) what
were the amounts, frequency and significant dividends paid in the past; (7) was
there a sufficient accumulation of earned surplus to cover the distribution or was it
partly out of capital? Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Genevra Herman, 32 T.C. 479 (1959).
10. Some of the factors and circumstances generally considered to be valid business
purposes for the redemption under § 115(g) of the 1939 Code were: (1) enabling
the business to operate more efficiently as a sole proprietorship or as a partnership;
(2) the conduct of part of its business under separate corporate form; (3) enhancement of its credit rating by calling in stock to cancel stockholder indebtedness; (4)
resale of stock to junior executives; (5) provision of a profitable investment for an
employees' association; (6) adjustment for a legitimate shrinkage of the business
following a fire causing a permanent reduction in productive capacity; (7) elimination
of unprofitable departments; (8) contemplation of ultimate liquidation. B. BrrrKm,
FEnmiAL INcOME TAXATION OF CorxoaATIoNs AND SHAEmoLDERs 211 (1959).
11. Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945) (effect, not form,
is controlling).
12. The basic "net effect" test was actually adopted in Flanagan v. Helvering,
116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("net effect" rather than motives and plans is the
essential criterion of "equivalency").
13. In making the comparison, factors to be considered were whether the same
shareholders would have received the identical payments had the redemption been
a dividend, and whether the redemption altered the shareholders' respective rights to
future earnings and control over the corporation. See generally Ballenger v. United
States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
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purpose so that the inferences of the objective comparison might
be overcome by the demonstrable existence of a legitimate business
motivation and thus prevent injustice to the shareholder. 14 In its
draft of section 302 of the 1954 Code 15 the House Ways and Means
Committee sought to promote certainty and predictability in the
field of dividend equivalency by providing only automatic formulae
for use in redemption situations. 6 No generally applicable "essentially
equivalent" provision similar to section 115(g) was included, but the
Senate Finance Committee inserted such a provision by adding section
302(b) (1), stating that the House bill "appeared unnecessarily restrictive."17 The independency of the broad equivalency test was
further ensured by section 302(b) (5), which states that failure to
comply with the automatic formulae sections, 302(b) (2)-(4), does
not preclude inquiry into dividend equivalency under section
302(b) (1). However, controversy still exists as to the general interpretation and intended scope of section 302(b) (1). If "existing
law"' 8 and the words following in the Senate Report are given a
literal construction, then it is arguable that the section was added
to incorporate all of the pre-1954 judicial interpretation of the phrase
"essentially equivalent to a dividend." But if the section was included only to prevent possible injustice to shareholders by application of the strict House bill in several isolated circumstances, such
as sudden corporate redemptions of minority preferred stock holdings, 9 then it is "not easy to give section 302(b) (1) an expansive
construction" 20 and it therefore would assume a limited role in
keeping with the objective thrust of the section of which it is a part.
14. See Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1st Cir. 1954) (essentially pro rata redemption was part of legitimate corporate purpose and therefore not dividend).
15. H.R. RFP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
16. These formulae are represented by LNT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 302(b)(2)-(4),
17. "While the House bill sets forth definite conditions under which stock may be
redeemed at capital gains rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly in the case of redemption of preferred stock which might be called by a
corporation without the shareholder having any control over when the redemption
may take place. Accordingly, your Committee follows existing law by reinserting
the general language indicating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution
in part or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1954).
18. "In general, under this subsection your Committee intends to incorporate into
the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is essentially equivalent to a
dividend under section 115(g)(1) of the 1939 Code, and in addition to provide
three definite standards in order to provide certainty in specific instances. . . . The
test intended to be incorporated in the interpretation of paragraph (1) section
302(b) (1) is in general that currently employed under section 115(g) of the 1939
Code." Id. at 45.
19. S. REe. No. 1622, supra note 17.
20. B. Brrimm & J. ETisnc, FEDm&AL INCOME TAXATION OF COnPOnATIONS &
SHM moEnasmS 291 (2d ed. 1966).
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The weight of case law under section 302(b) (1) reveals that the
courts have generally regarded the section as intended to incorporate
existing law including the numerous variations of the "net effect"
test.21 Nevertheless, pre-1954 confusion still exists with respect to

the relative importance of "business purpose" among other more
objective criteria indicating economic effect. Most courts have
adopted the flexible "net effect" test and have reviewed evidence
purporting to show a legitimate business purpose, but they have
generally not viewed it as controlling, unless the business motive is
substantial. 23 The minority position has adhered to the strict net
effect objective approach and has generally disregarded the subjective
business motive.24
Regardless of which variation of the "net effect" test is chosen, a
court must still determine whether a redemption has effected a
meaningful change in a shareholder's position relative to the corporation and other shareholders. Thus, another significant change in the
1954 Code is relevant to the dividend equivalency determination. The
House Ways and Means Committee included in its version of the
bill certain constructive ownership rules, embodied in section 318(a)
and made applicable to section 302(b) by section 302(c). However,
the extent to which the attribution rules are applicable to section
302(b) (1) has been questioned by some authorities, 25 since the
Senate addition of the section 302(b) (1) general equivalency test
made no reference to the constructive ownership rules. This problem
becomes especially significant when the stock in question is held
by family members in a closely-held corporation and none of the
automatic formulae of sections 302(b) (2)- (4) apply.. Most courts
have automatically applied the family attribution (constructive ownership) rules,2 6 regardless of legislative history, and this has resulted
in striking variations from pre-1954 law, since the rules did not then
21. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964) (applied flexible "net
effect" test to find dividend equivalency); Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192
(4th Cir. 1962) (discusses both "flexible" and "strict" and finds dividend equivalency).
22. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
23. See id.; Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962); Bradbury
v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962) (recognized taxpayer had proved valid
business purpose but held not sufficient to overcome pro rata distribution).
24. See, e.g., McGinty v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1963) (applied
strict "net effect" test to find dividend equivalency).
25. See, e.g., Cohen, Redemptions of Stock Under the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 739, 758-59 (1955). The Treasury Regulations initially
made the application of the attribution rules to § 302(b)(1) mandatory, but they now
provide only that the rules are "one of the facts to be considered .... "Treas. Reg.
§ 1.302-2(b) (1955).
26. See Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962) (applied attribution rules to find shareholder's position did not change significantly); Thomas G. Lewis,
35 T.C. 71 (1960) (applied attribution rules, recognizing it as "new dimension").
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exist statutorily.27 The Tax Court has, nevertheless, shown an inclina-

tion to apply the attribution rules only when the facts of the case

reveal a sufficient community of interest to dictate their application.2
This approach has likewise been endorsed by the Fourth Circuit and

some commentators.P
In interpreting section 302(b) (1) the instant court first synthesized
the various dividend equivalency tests of section 115(g) and recognized that its past reliance on economic effects resulting from
changes in a shareholder's basic rights of ownership was a much
more objective net effect test than those adopted by other courts.

Reviewing the legislative history of 302(b) (1), the court concluded
that the section should not be given an "expansive" role, but should

be applied in a manner consistent with its "objective" statutory
context. The court then reasoned that the section 318(a) construc-

tive ownership rules likewise represented an objective approach and
concluded that section 302(c)(1) makes the section 318(a) rules
applicable to section 302(b) stock ownership situations and, therefore, subsequent to the redemption the petitioner must be deemed
the owner of her son's shares.30 The court rejected petitioner's argument that the "bona fides" of the redemption should be considered

to reflect the absence of a tax avoidance motive and therefore mitigate
the family attribution rules. While the court admitted that a proper

case might indeed require such mitigation, it noted that petitioner
had shown no valid reason here for refraining from an automatic
application of the attribution rules.
Although decisional interpretation of section 302(b)(1) contains
few settled principles, there are certain apparent trends which

provide an adequate starting point for an analysis of the instant
court's conclusions. In every dividend equivalency determination
under section 302(b) (1) it is first necessary to consider what changes,
if any, occurred in the shareholder's basic interests in the corporation,

since a distribution of an ordinary dividend does not disturb such
27. id.
28. See Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966) (ignored attribution rules and found
no dividend equivalency); Estate of Arthur H. Squier, 35 T.C. 950 (1961) (applied
attribution rules but found no dividend equivalency, since sufficient family estrangement present to reduce community of interest). One district court has recently applied
the attribution rules but found an overriding business purpose. Davis v. United
States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
29. See Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1962); B. Brrrr
& J.Eusrrcs, supra note 20, at 292; Bittker, The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and
Partial Liquidations, 44 CORaNLL L.Q. 299 (1959).
30. 385 F.2d at 526. Before the redemption petitioner owned 484 shares and constructively owned her son's 331 shares, or about 63% of the outstanding shares. Thus,
after the redemption her son owned all of the shares, but under the court's application
of § 318(a) petitioner still constructively owned all of her son's shares and she therefore
became the constructive owner of 100% of the stock.
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interests. In this regard, the instant court's emphasis on objective
changes in basic rights of ownership is consistent with the rationale
of the flexible "net effect" test. However, the flexible "net effect"
jurisdictions, which comprise a preponderant majority, go one
step further and permit a showing of a substantial business purpose
as an additional factor for consideration. It can be argued that
dividend equivalence is a status and that the particular subjective
motive is irrelevant. Further, a tax avoidance motive is not always
present in the context of a final determination of divided equivalency,
and, in fact, a legitimate motive might be present. Certainly, a tax
advisor can never rely with certainty upon whether a particular
legitimate business purpose will qualify a redemption for capital
gains treatment. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the 1954
Code reveals that section 302(b) (1) was reinserted into the area of
dividend equivalency as a subjective influence. In view of this, the
instant court's conclusion that the section was intended to provide
a restricted, objective function is erroneous. It is clear that the
House version of section 302 was written with predictability as its
object, and consequently it was considerably more severe than
section 115(g). But the Senate's addition of the section 302(b)(1)
general equivalency test, under the stated purpose of maintaining
existing law, had a definite liberalizing effect upon the thrust of
section 302. Therefore it is strongly arguable that the Code draftsmen intended that business purpose, being a significant factor in
existing law, should be considered as a factor in a section 302(b) (1)
equivalency determination. Furthermore, since it was apparently the
function of section 302(b) (1) to provide a vehicle for factual inquiry,
the instant court's conclusions with respect to application of the
section '318(a) attribution rules are subject to question. Existing
law in 1954 did not include statutory constructive ownership rules,
and certainly legislative history does not conclusively indicate that
the rules should be applied to section 302(b) (1). Further, the
function of the attribution rules is to reflect a presumed community
of interest. However, since such a presumption may well be at
variance with actual facts, there is no good reason to deny capital
gains treatment on the basis of a conclusive presumption. The
instant court stated that strict application of the attribution rules
may be inappropriate31 in certain cases, but its earlier language
which emphasized "certainty" and "precision" in applying the rules
reflects a reluctance to consider the "bona fides" of a change in
ownership if the attribution rules dictate a finding of dividend
equivalency. In effect, an automatic application of the rules forecloses
further factual inquiry which is contrary to the basic policy of section
31. Id. at 527.
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302(b) (1). A more proper approach to the constructive ownership
rules in respect to this section would seem to require their application
only when prior factual inquiry reveals a sufficient community of
interest.

Taxation-IRS Rules Organization Which
Discriminates on Basis of Race Not Charitable
The Internal Revenue Service was asked for its opinion as to whether
a non-profit corporation which provides free recreational facilities to
all residents of the community except members of the Negro race is
exempt from the federal income tax as a charitable organization described in section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
whether contributions and transfers to or for the use of such an organization are deductible under sections 170, 2055, 2106, and 2522 of the
Code. The Internal Revenue Service, ruled, no. A non-profit organization which operates a facility established for the benefit of all the
members of the community is not exempt from the federal income tax
as a charitable organization, if the use of the facility is restricted to
less than the entire community on the basis of race, and contributions
and transfers to or for the use of such an organization are not deductible. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 40, at 7.
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code allows an income tax
deduction from the taxpayer's gross income for "charitable contributions" to a wide range of organizations, including those "organized
and operated exclusively for ... charitable ... purposes . . . ."I To
further encourage charitable pursuits, section 501 of the Code grants
tax-exempt status to certain organizations, including those organized
for exclusively charitable purposes. 2 The Regulations define "charitable" for income tax purposes in "its generally accepted legal sense,"3
as determined by general principles of trust law. Under trust doc-4
trine, to be considered charitable, a trust must confer a public benefit.
Certain purposes have been presumed to be sufficiently for the public
benefit despite the fact that the class of beneficiaries is limited. As
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c)(2)(B).
2. NT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(3), grants an exemption from income tax
to: "Corporations, and any community chest, fund or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes.

.

.

."

Similar deductions from federal estate and

gift taxes are allowed in sections 2055 (transfers for public, charitable, and religious
uses), 2106 (taxable estate), and 2522 (deduction for charitable and similar gifts).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(d)(2) (1961).
4. See 4 A. ScoTT, THE LAw oF TnusTs, §§ 375-375.2 (2d ed. 1956).
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long as the class is large enough so that the attainment of the trust
purposes is of sufficient benefit to the community, the trust will be
upheld as charitable. Such purposes include trusts to advance education, promote health, alleviate poverty and further religion.5 On
the other hand, certain purposes may or may not be charitable depending upon the size of the class of beneficiaries. For example, a
social club may be charitable if the class is large, but when the class
becomes so narrow that the community as a whole has no interest
in the organization's activities, it ceases to be charitable. Therefore,
where the purpose is not presumed to be of a public benefit, the class
of beneficiaries must be wider than that required for trusts to relieve
poverty, promote education, or protect health.6 However, it is not
required that a trust include all the members of the community in
the class of beneficiaries. 7 An organization to provide recreational
facilities falls within this second category and will be deemed charitable only if the class is wide enough to serve a public purpose. Prior
to 1959, the Internal Revenue Service did not allow a deduction
under section 170 for contributions to organizations to establish community recreational facilities. But in 1959, the Service acquiesced in
a 1953 Tax Court decision which allowed such a deduction on the
ground that the contribution was to a non-profit organization operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. 8 In that case, the
court specifically noted that the contemplated recreational facilities
were not restricted in any sense, but were for the use of every member of the community. Although few prior cases have dealt with the
validity of tax exemptions and deductions for contributions to racially
selective organizations, such exemptions and deductions appear to
have been freely granted. 9
5. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUTss §§ 369-73 (1959): § 369 (relief of poverty),
§ 370 (advancement of education), § 371 (advancement of religion), § 372 (promotion of health), § 373 (governmental or municipal purposes).
6. Professor Scott notes that "a trust to promote the happiness or well-being of
members of the community is charitable, although it is not a trust to relieve poverty,
advance education, promote religion, or protect health. In such a case, however, the
trust must be for the benefit of the members of the community generally and not
merely for the benefit of a class of persons." 4 ScoTr, supra note 4, at § 375.2. See
RESTATE~mNT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs §368(f) (1959).
7. "[A) trust to promote the happiness or well-being of members of the community . . . need not directly benefit all the members of the community" but "a
trust unconnected with the relief of poverty or the advancement of education or
religion or health in order to be charitable must be for the benefit of a larger class
than need be benefitted if the trust is connected with such purposes." 4 A. Scorrr,
supra note 4, at § 375.2.
8. Peters v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 55 (1953), non acq., 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 8,
acquiesced in, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 6.
9. In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950), a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the granting of a state
tax exemption to a corporation which leased apartments on a discriminatory basis
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The Internal Revenue Service, in the instant ruling, noted that the
Internal Revenue Code contains no "specialized tax concept" of
charitable purposes, but favors only those purposes which are recognized as charitable by trust law. The Service considered organizations
to be charitable if they were: (1) non-profit, (2) served a generally
recognized public purpose, and (3) were for the members of the
general public. In regard to the third requirement, the Service posited
that the class had to include the entire community to be considered
charitable. Since part of the community was excluded on the basis
of race, the class was not composed of the entire community, and
therefore, the recreational facilities were not entitled to tax-exemption
as a charitable organization under section 501. Furthermore, contributions to the discriminatory non-profit corporation were non-dedeductible for income tax purposes under section 170, nor were
transfers to it deductible for estate or gift tax purposes under sections
2055, 2106, and 2522.
In the instant ruling, the Internal Revenue Service dealt only
with the tax-exempt status of organizations of general benefit to the
community, which require a wider class of beneficiaries to be considered charitable.' 0 The ruling, then, is inapplicable to many of the
most invidious examples of racial discrimination. Where an organization is performing a function considered intrinsically for the public
benefit, the class of beneficiaries may be narrow without the organization being deemed non-charitable. Thus, the ruling does not
encompass racially restrictive organizations furthering education, promoting health, or alleviating poverty, and they will retain their
current tax-exempt status. There is very little reason not to extend
the instant ruling to encompass all charitable organizations. The
Regulations require all organizations qualifying under section 501 to
was dismissed for lack of standing. The decision was unanimous. In a companion
case, the court, by a 4-3 vote, held that a tax exemption was not sufficient to support
state action. The court stated: "Tax exemption and the power of eminent domain
are freely given to many organizations which necessarily limit their benefits to a
restricted group. It has not been held that that the recipients are subject to the
restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551. But see
Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721
(1945) (direct state financial support of public library constituted state action forbidden by fourteenth amendment). It can be argued that since tax exemptions
constitute financial support from the state which must be offset by higher taxes on
non-exempt taxpayers, it is inconsistent to allow indirectly that which is prohibited
directly. See Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of
Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957), especially note 96 and accompanying text.
10. The Service expanded the requirements for a "general benefit, wide class of
beneficiaries" trust by requiring the class to include the entire community. Professor
Scott did not feel that the entire community need be included, but only felt a class
wider than that needed for a trust performing a purpose considered intrinsically charitable was required.
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serve a public purpose." Furthermore, under trust law, a trust per12
forming activities which are against public policy is non-charitable.
To continue to grant tax-exempt status to racially segregated organizations presently considered charitable would contravene a prevailing
public policy against racial segregation. 13 While segregated private
schools admittedly perform a public service by educating some mem-

bers of the community, they may do psychological harm to a sizable

portion of the public.14 Racially discriminatory charitable organizations operated for purposes to which this ruling does not presently
apply are sufficiently against public policy to lose their tax exemptions
as charitable organizations. Finally, to continue to grant tax exemp-

tions and to allow tax deductions may violate the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,19 which prohibits racial discrimination "under any program
or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance."' 6 The legislative
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1961). See also H.R. REP. No. 1860,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938), cited in UNITED STATES Comm'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGRGATION 237 (1967): "The Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have
to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by benefits resulting from the
general welfare."
12. RESTATEmENT (SEcOND) OF ThusTs § 377, comment (c) (1959). See also
UNITED STATES Con'N ON CIVIL RIG HTS, supra note 11, at 240-41. In fact, tax
exempt status for segregated organizations may be illegal as violative of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 245-52.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNTD) OF TRUsTs § 368, comment (b) (1959): "A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as to
justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity ...
There is no fixed standard to determine what purposes are of such interest to the
community; the interests of the community vary with time and place." See also Power,
The Racially Discriminatory Charitable Trust: A Suggested Treatment, 9 ST. Louis
L.J. 478, 481-82 (1965).
14. "Classification by race is altogether different in psychological origin and effect
from other methods of classifying beneficiaries. It is designed to hurt not to benefit,
and sociologists tell us that this is its effect. The malevolence of racial selection is
the antithesis of charity, and therein might be found the basis for a legal distinction."
Clark, supra note 9, at 1001. See generally A. KAnDINEn & L. OvEsEY, THE MARK
OF OPPRESSION (1951).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6 (1964).
16. The Supreme Court has noted that tax exemption is a form of governmental
financial assistance. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state property tax exemption was one of elements of state action); Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince
Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (disallowed state tax credit against real
estate and personal property taxes for contributions to private segregated schools);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). But see Guillory v.
Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), vacated, 207 F. Supp.
554 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1962). The propriety of using the
federal tax laws to further other areas of public policy is unsettled. Compare Tank
Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (taxpayer who could not operate
profitably without violating maximum weight limitations denied business deduction
because such a deduction would frustrate sharply defined public policy), with Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (refusal to use tax laws to enforce other
policies).
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history of this Act indicates that "financial assistance" was meant to
include both direct grants and indirect benefits. 17 Since tax-exempt
status and tax deductibility are indirect financial benefits, a racially
restrictive organization should be denied this benefit under the
terms of the Civil Rights Act. It is hoped that the Internal Revenue Service will complement its significant first step and extend
the instant ruling to all charitable organizations described in section 501(c) (3) and to all contributions to charitable organizations
under section 170(c) (2)(B).
17. See 110 CONG. Rlc. 2467 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Celler (Dem. N.Y.)):
"In general, it seems rather anomalous that the Federal Government should aid and
abet discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by granting money
and other kinds of financial aid."

